process 4 , but are primarily conducted in isolation, and the results of these studies have yet to be 9 4 consolidated and synthesized. Furthermore, cross-validation of regional models has only been 9 5 recently attempted 19 , and indicates either limitations in model transferability, or possible genetic 9 6 or ecological differences underlying distributional patterns of different regions; either way, this 9 7
highlights the limitations preventing regional models from being scaled up to a global estimate. 9 8
Moreover, the distribution of anthrax has yet to be modelled in several broad regions where it is 9 9 nevertheless pervasive, especially Western Europe, the Middle East, and South America. Cryptic 1 0 0 persistence of B. anthracis spores in the soil makes mapping efforts especially challenging, as 1 0 1 suitable and endemic regions could go years or potentially decades without a recorded outbreak. 1 0 2
This study consolidates clinical and ecological research on enzootic and epidemic anthrax 1 0 3
reports, compiling the largest global database of anthrax occurrences on record to map the global 1 0 4 suitability for Bacillus anthracis persistence. A total of 5,108 records were compiled describing 1 0 5 the global distribution of anthrax across 70 countries (Figure 1 ). Here we used a subset of 2,310 1 0 6 of these data points to describe the global distribution and eco-epidemiology of Bacillus 1 0 7
anthracis, exploring the relationship of anthrax outbreaks to environmental factors including soil 1 0 8 characteristics and climate, via boosted regression trees (BRTs) as a tool for species distribution 1 0 9 modelling. These maps provide a proxy for anthrax risk. We apply this global anthrax model to 1 1 0 provide a first estimate of the global human and livestock populations at risk from anthrax. We 1 1 1 compare the distribution of anthrax to that of critically threatened wildlife populations, and 1 1 2 identify areas where additional or new surveillance is needed to anticipate and prevent rare, but 1 1 3 likely catastrophic, threats to wildlife conservation efforts. 1 1 4
Our global ensemble distribution model (Figure 2) anthrose-deficiency mutation that has been hypothesized to lead to a vaccine escape 25 . Education 1 6 3 campaigns may be more cost-effective than mass vaccination, which is both cost-prohibitive and 1 6 4 logistically-challenging in inaccessible rural areas. However, livestock keepers may continue to 1 6 5 sell contaminated meat to recoup financial losses (which also contributes to underreporting); this 1 6 6 has increased cases urban settings 26 . In cases of extreme food insecurity, poor populations may 1 6 7 eat anthrax-infected meat despite understanding the risks.
Although risk is most commonly measured at the human-agriculture interface, anthrax 1 6 9 also has a major ecological impact; while B. anthracis is a stable part of some savannah 1 7 0 ecosystems, epizootics in other regions can have catastrophic impacts on wildlife 1 7 1 populations 14,27 . We note that several ungulate species could probably benefit from improved 1 7 2 epizootic surveillance, given range overlap with anthrax and limited coverage by protected areas, 1 7 3 which are a foundation of anthrax surveillance and control for most wildlife (Table 3) . 28 Saiga 1 7 4
antelope (Saiga tatarica) in particular have a significant overlap with anthrax outside of 1 7 5 protected parts of their range, and the recent mass die-off of a third of the entire population of 1 7 6 saiga in three weeks highlights the vulnerability of threatened ungulates to sudden, disease-1 7 7
induced population crashes. The anthrax vaccine may be used by conservationists in special 1 7 8
cases (e.g. with cheetahs and rhinoceros 29 ), but the lack of an oral anthrax vaccine makes mass 1 7 9 vaccination more impractical for wildlife than for livestock, making surveillance all the more 1 8 0 important. 1 8 1
Our study has proposed the first global map of B. anthracis suitability as a proxy for 1 8 2 anthrax risk, and while this is a major step forward, several important directions remain to make 1 8 3 these models actionable for public health practitioners. ; however, this approach seems inadequate for anthrax, given 1 8 9 that human incidence is just as strongly determined by anthrax dynamics in wildlife, local 1 9 0 agricultural intensity, knowledge about anthrax transmission, access to healthcare and 1 9 1 vaccination, and complicating factors like food insecurity. At national and local levels, One 1 9 2
Health approaches to surveillance have had promising results, but a more globally-coordinated 1 9 3 network among these programs might help address some of the major data gaps. 1 9 4
Our work also sets a foundation for investigating how climate change will impact the 1 9 5 distribution and burden of anthrax. We assembled a global occurrence database for Bacillus anthracis out of a combination of (i) 2 2 7 outbreak data collected in the field by the authors or their extended team of collaborators, (ii) 2 2 8 national passive surveillance and reporting infrastructures, (iii) online records from ProMed 2 2 9
Mail, and (iv) georeferenced records or (v) digitized maps from peer-reviewed publications 2 3 0 documenting anthrax outbreaks. Our final database of 5,018 unique records spanning 70 2 3 1 countries and more than a century (1914 -2018) , thinned to 2,310 distinct localities after 2 3 2 removing uncertain sightings and thinning to a single point per unique 10 arcminute (~20 km at 2 3 3 the equator) cell, to correct for sampling bias 34 . For background environmental data, a total 2 3 4 dataset of 10,000 pseudoabsences were randomly generated from countries where anthrax 2 3 5 occurrence records were collected, an upper sample commonly used for similar disease 2 3 6 distribution mapping studies 35 . Of these 10,000, an equal 1:1 sample was randomly selected to 2 3 7 match the presence points in submodels, as is recommended for boosted regression tree 2 3 8 models 36 . 2 3 9 2 4 0 Environmental Predictors 2 4 1
Global layers of environmental predictors were selected based on successful variables used in 2 4 2 previously published anthrax distribution modelling studies at regional scales 5,21,37 , as well as 2 4 3 from other distribution modelling studies on soil-borne pathogens 30 . Climate data were taken 2 4 4 from version 1.4 of the WorldClim dataset, which includes nineteen bioclimatic variables 2 4 5 characterizing average and seasonal trends in temperature and precipitation 38 . In addition to 2 4 6 climate data, we included layers describing elevation, soil, and two vegetation indices. 2 4 7
Elevational data was taken from the Global Multi-resolution Terrain Elevation Data 2 4 8 (GMTED2010) dataset provided by the US Geological Service. Soil layers were taken from the 2 4 9
Global Soil Information Facilities (GSIF) SoilGrids database at 250 m resolution; four layers 2 5 0 were included: soil pH, and the predicted soil content of sand, humult, and calcic vertisols at a 2 5 1 depth of 0-5 cm 39 . The mean and amplitude of the normalized difference vegetation index 2 5 2 (NDVI) were taken from the Trypanosomiasis & Land Use in Africa (TALA) dataset 40 . To 2 5 3 prevent overfitting and reduce correlation among predictor variables, the variable set was 2 5 4 reduced down using an automated procedure within the boosted regression tree implementation. . In our study, BRTs were implemented using the 'gbm' package in 2 6 0 R to develop a global species distribution model for Bacillus anthracis. Automated variable set 2 6 1 reduction procedures selected a total of seventeen predictor layers: ten bioclimatic variables, two 2 6 2 vegetation indices, elevation, and four soil variables. Presence, absence, and environmental data 2 6 3 were run through the 'gbm.step' procedure on default settings (tree complexity = 4, learning rate 2 6 4 = 0.005), following the established template of other studies. A total of 500 submodels were run; 2 6 5 for each, presence points were bootstrapped, and pseudoabsences were randomly selected from 2 6 6 the total 10,000 to achieve a 1:1 ratio 36 . Separate from the internal cross-validation (75%-25% 2 6 7 split) of the BRT procedure, both presence and pseudoabsence points were split into an 80% 2 6 8 training and 20% test dataset in each submodel, and model AUC was evaluated based on the 2 6 9 independent test dataset. A final average model was calculated across the 500 submodels, and the 2 7 0 5 th and 95 th percentile were retained for use in the population at risk analyses. Models performed 2 7 1 very well on the withheld test data (mean submodel AUC = 0.9244). We estimated the vulnerability of human and livestock populations by overlaying population 2 7 5 datasets with maps of anthrax-suitable areas 42 . We mapped global anthrax suitability by 2 7 6 dichotomizing model predictions with a threshold of 0.565 for suitable versus unsuitable 2 7 7 predictions, with the threshold selected to maximize the true skill statistic (which weights 2 7 8 sensitivity and specificity equally) of mean predictions across the entire dataset of all sightings 2 7 9 and pseudoabsences. We estimated global population at risk using human population counts for 2 8 0 2015 from the Gridded Population of the World (GPW) dataset, version 4.0. We dichotomized 2 8 1 "urban" and "rural" areas using the Global Human Built-up and Settlement Extent (HBASE) 2 8 2 Dataset, version 1.0. We further split "urban" areas into urban and peri-urban based on the GPW 2 8 3 population dataset, where we used a density under 1,000 persons per km 2 as the threshold for 2 8 4 0
Hyg. trv050 (2015). 
